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Preface 
 
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee 
 
 
 
 
Much attention has been given to the dramatic rise of Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi as a statesman in the regional and 
international political theaters since his electoral victory in May 
2014. U.S. President Barack H. Obama’s latest visit to India in late 
January was significant because it affirmed Washington’s 
determination to forge an alliance with India against a rising 
China. After a decade of antiterrorism efforts concentrated on 
Central Asia and the Middle East, the U.S. has become an active 
player in shaping the balance of power between China and India.  
 
As ancient civilizations, China and India coexisted in peace for 
millennia with the Himalayas separating them. Political contacts 
between ancient China and India were minimal. But culturally 
Buddhism spread from India to China (and then to Korea and 
Japan) and this religion completely transformed Chinese society 
and culture. 
 
As modern nation-states in the late twentieth century, with the 
exception of the early 1950s, diplomatic relations between China 
and India were characterized by border conflicts, regional rivalries 
and strategic competition. Sino-Indian border conflicts resulted 
from the rejection by Beijing of the British-drawn McMahon Line 
of 1913–1914 separating India and Tibet, the flight of the 
Fourteenth Dalai Lama to India after the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, as 
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well as the dispute following the 1962 border war in which China 
seized 38,000 km2 of Indian territory in Aksai Chin, and another 
5,180 km2 of northern Kashmir that Pakistan ceded to Beijing 
under a 1963 pact. China has been keen to avoid confronting a 
powerful India south of the Himalayas. Outraged by India’s 
support of the creation of the Dalai Lama’s exiled government in 
Dharamsala, Beijing responded by supporting Pakistan in the 1965 
Indo-Pakistani War. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, continuous 
Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan indicated the close links 
between Beijing and Islamabad.  
 
The wider Cold War conflict greatly complicated Sino-Indian 
relations, as shown by the Soviet alliance with India and U.S. 
support for China from the 1970s onward. Despite the gradual 
Sino-Indian rapprochement after the visit of the-then Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988, China refused to sacrifice 
its strategic partnership with Pakistan. This “two-front threat” (i.e., 
Pakistan in the west and China in the north and northeast) gave 
rise to Indian leaders’ worries about China’s containment policy.  
 
Two security issues have affected the latest development of 
Sino-Indian relations. One issue has to do with China’s concern 
about the spread of Islamic extremism from Central Asia to 
Xinjiang. An unstable Pakistan threatens the security of China’s 
western frontier. In May 2009, several identifiable groups with al-
Qaeda links attacked Chinese investors and workers in Pakistan. 
Seeing the escalating instability in Pakistan, China worried about 
the political vacuum left by the U.S. military withdrawal from 
Central Asia and the use of Afghanistan as a training ground for 
Islamic militants in its Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 
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Another security issue concerns the Chinese naval expansion 
into the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Since 2013, China has 
launched a “Maritime Silk Route” initiative to establish a 
comprehensive system of oceanic ports, harbor infrastructures, 
and special economic zones in the South China Sea and the 
northern Indian Ocean. To further protect its lines of 
communication across the Indian and Pacific oceans, China has 
constructed new ports, maritime communications, and overland 
transport routes in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. 
In December 2011, China announced it would build an anti-piracy 
naval base in the Seychelles to counter U.S. maritime power. All 
these geostrategic efforts were designed to consolidate China’s 
control over its extensive overland and maritime frontiers.  
  
Indian policymakers always view China as an interloper in 
South Asia, an external power that challenges India’s natural 
sphere of influence. As a rising power, China perceives South Asia 
as a legitimate area for flexing its muscles against India and the 
U.S. In response to this Chinese encirclement, India has pursued 
security relations with China’s neighbors in the Pacific Ocean, 
especially Vietnam, Japan and Taiwan. As the global balance of 
power is gradually shifting from China to the U.S. and its allies, 
India will seize the opportunity to counter Chinese influence and 
reclaim its status as a regional power. Evidently, both China and 
India have adopted defensive security measures to balance against 
each other in the wider Asian region.  
  
Against this geopolitical backdrop, this occasional paper has 
three essays written by professors from Pace University and 
Nanjing Normal University that address a host of structural 
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challenges facing China and India in pursuit of sustainable 
development in the early twenty-first century. Pan Zhen gives a 
critical overview of China’s economic policies, and finds the top-
down development model to be fraught with tensions. Joseph Tse-
Hei Lee argues that the ability of China to pursue sustainable 
growth and social betterment is largely contingent upon many 
circumstantial factors, especially the negative attributes of 
globalization and the rise of domestic discontents. Satish K. Kolluri 
shifts the focus of discussion to the electoral victory of Narendra 
Modi in India, and examines the implications of the rise of Modi in 
domestic and regional politics.  
 
Taken together, these essays throw light on the political and 
socioeconomic trajectories of China and India. Since both countries 
have significantly liberalized their economies in recent decades, 
the unprecedented expansion of their capabilities and influences is 
a complex phenomenon, rooted in the context of particular 
temporal and spatial settings, and the need to accommodate 
endogenous and exogenous forces of change.  
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The Change and Development of China’s 
Economic Policies 
 
Pan Zhen 
 
 
 
 
Since China launched its modernization program in 1978, the 
national economy has experienced an unprecedented level of 
growth for decades. The top-down policies from the central 
government constituted a major driving force of development.1 
This article examines the institutional mechanisms and 
performance of Chinese economic reforms. It highlights some of 
the challenges in China’s quest for sustainable development and 
provides several policy suggestions to strengthen the country’s 
reform efforts. 
 
 
China’s Reform Policies Since 1978 
China’s reform policies entailed economic restructuring at six 
levels. First was the transformation of rural economy. China 
initially restructured the agricultural sector with cautious 
experiments in selected locations. 2 The central government 
abolished the Maoist system of people’s communes built on 
egalitarianism, implemented the household contract responsibility 
system, and established a legal mechanism to circulate land among 
rural residents. Farmers were liberated from the daunting 
constraints of agrarian work and provided cheap labor for the 
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township industrial enterprises. Second was the “open-door” 
policy that set up Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen to attract foreign investment in 1980. 
The number of SEZ increased to fourteen coastal cities in May 1984 
including Dalian and Qinhuangdao in northern China. During the 
1990s, major cities along the Yangtze River like Chongqing and 
Wuhan, along with thirteen border cities, were opened to foreign 
trade. This multi-directional and multi-layered strategy was 
designed to integrate Chinese coastal and inland industries into 
the global production chain.  
 
The third area concerned the reform of ownership structure. 
While China vigorously developed the private sector, it 
established a mixed economic system to accommodate the 
longstanding form of public ownership. This not only enabled the 
government authorities of all levels to improve the efficiency of 
state-owned enterprises, but also provided support to the vibrant 
private sector.3 The fourth area had to do with the reform of price 
system. The state controlled the commodity price during the 
Maoist era. The reform gave rise to a double-track pricing system, 
enabling the government and market to regulate the supply of 
goods and services.4 
  
 Fifth was the reform of financial system. Starting from 1979, the 
central government broke the monopoly of the People’s Bank of 
China as the only banking institution in the country, and 
permitted the formation of commercial banks. It also implemented 
a system of foreign currency exchange. There used to be a dual-
exchange rate system for Chinese currency. Foreigners and 
overseas Chinese were not permitted to own yuan. They had to 
exchange their hard currency for the foreign exchange certificates 
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at the People’s Bank of China and redeem them at state-run stores. 
On January 1, 1994, China unified the dual-exchange rate system 
to strengthen the economy. The last area concerned the reform of 
taxation. Under the old taxation system, only the central 
government was permitted to collect and distribute tax uniformly. 
The new taxation system allowed the central and local authorities 
to specify their respective expenses by creating new tax codes. This 
arrangement gave the local officials incentive to attract domestic 
and international investment in various development projects. The 
competition between different regions to attract investment 
contributed to the reduction of economic gaps between coastal and 
inland areas. 
 
 
The Chinese Economic Miracle  
The reform policies completely transformed China’s economy. 
From 1978 onward, China experienced continuous economic 
growth for thirty-five years. The overall gross national income 
(GNI) increased from 364.52 billion yuan in 1978 to 47.21 trillion 
yuan in 2011, a growth of almost 130 times. Its gross domestic 
product (GDP) reached US$8.36 trillion in 2012, making China the 
world’s second largest economy after the U.S. It had the world’s 
largest foreign exchange reserves, holding a total amount of 
US$1.9 trillion in 2008 and US$3.31 trillion in 2012. Its inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) outperformed all the development 
countries and reached US$111.72 billion in 2012, making the 
country the world’s second largest market for FDI for the last 
nineteen years. It was also the largest trading nation in the world, 
and its total volume of imports and exports reached US$3.867 
trillion in 2012. These statistics confirmed the success of 
modernization and contributed to China’s rise to prominence in 
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global economy. 
  
 Institutionally, China’s success owed much to its social and 
political stability, an integrated system of public and private 
property rights, and its strong Communist leadership. Ever since 
the beginning of the modernization, China put in place a system of 
property rights, welcomed foreign investment, and laid a solid 
microeconomic foundation for growth. It also redoubled the 
efforts to deregulate economic rules, embrace more free-market 
principles, and permit greater autonomy for state-owned and 
private enterprises. The enterprises took advantage of the cheap 
and abundant labor force to expand manufacturing, and launched 
new products and services to compete with one another. The 
success of the enterprises ensured decades of stability and 
prosperity. 
  
 From the demand side, high investment and foreign trade 
accelerated China’s growth. Local authorities employed pro-
business policies, providing investors with cheap land and little 
environmental supervision. China also adhered to the export-
oriented strategy as Japan and South Korea had done. It 
deliberately kept its currency undervalued and gave subsidies to 
export-oriented enterprises. Global economy maintained a good 
momentum of growth before 2008 and created countless 
opportunities for China. As a result, Chinese export expanded 
steadily from its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 to the global financial crisis in 2008, with the compound 
growth rate of export being over 20%. 
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Challenges Facing Chinese Economy 
The Chinese economy, however, has encountered a series of 
structural problems, the first one being an inner imbalance of 
demand and supply. Although the overall consumption, 
investment, and net exports have increased, the rate of 
consumption growth is significantly lower than other developed 
and developing nations. From 1980 to 2011, the rate of 
consumption growth fell from 65.5% to 49.1% of China’s GDP, 
when the investment rate increased from 34.8% to 48.3%. Worse 
still, the ratio of private consumption declined sharply, reaching 
less than 60% of the country’s GDP, whereas that ratio in other 
was about 60%. Another problem is China’s heavy dependence on 
investment. The overall investment rate almost reached 50% of 
China’s GDP, the highest in the world, and the rates of most 
countries were usually between 30% and 40%. Under the massive 
economic stimulus policies in 2008, China’s investment rate is 
bound to rise in the coming years. These figures indicate that the 
Chinese economy has been heavily dependent on foreign trade 
and high trade surplus. From 2003 to 2008, more than half of 
China’s GDP was driven by foreign trade, and from 2005 to 2007, 
that figure reached over 60%. Due to the aftermaths of the 2008 
global financial crisis, the figure fell down to 43.7% in 2009, but 
rebound to 50.1% in 2011. In this perspective, China has been 
extremely vulnerable to any fluctuations in the global economy. 
  
 Equally problematic is the unfair distribution system in China. 
At the beginning of the economic reform, the national government 
favored pragmatism over ideology. It “gave priority to efficiency 
with due consideration to fairness” (,  xiaolu 
youxian, jiangu gongping) and “let some of the people get rich first” 
(	
 rang yixie ren xianfu qilai). Through tax refunds 
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and subsides, the state supported entrepreneurs and middle-class 
professionals, and tolerated the widening gap between the rich 
and the poor, and the occasional outbreaks of popular discontent. 
The percentage of national fiscal revenue grew faster than the 
overall GDP for many years. After the national taxation system 
reform in 1995, the rate of government expenses reached as high as 
23% of its GDP in 2012. 
  
 Shortly after the global financial crisis, the entire world entered 
a period of structural readjustment. Many countries strove to 
control trade deficit, and some countries embraced protectionism 
to save domestic industries. This made it extremely difficult for 
China to grow its economy by relying on foreign trade.5 Moreover, 
the Chinese system of allocating investment resources was far 
from perfect.  The material returns from massive investment in 
infrastructure declined sharply, and there was a limited scope for 
investment-driven growth. 
 
 Because of the appreciation of yuan and the rise of labor cost, 
Chinese export-oriented industries became less competitive. 
Cheap labor force was used to drive the growth of labor-intensive 
industries during the 1980s and 1990s. But since 2005, there has 
been a problem of labor shortage, partly because of a hard-to-
reverse trend of demographic decline caused by the one-child 
policy, and partly because of the limited supply of new labor from 
the countryside. 
 
 Furthermore, more and more local governments could not 
afford to offer cheap land to attract investment. As the real estate 
market heated up, the value of the land was astronomically high in 
the metropolitan cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
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Chongqing, as well as many second- and third-tier cities. Although 
the real estate development brought in avenues for the local 
authorities, land expropriation and demolition were costly 
undertakings. Therefore, many governments in China’s 
southeastern provinces no longer provided the manufacturing 
sector with cheap land to build factories. In addition, rapid 
development consumed excessive resources and led to serious 
unethical business conducts. Pollution, environmental degradation, 
food safety problems, and business credit abuse troubled 
everyone.6 Despite its spectacular hardware and infrastructure, the 
development model of China’s economy is not sustainable.  
 
 
Structural Adjustment of the Economy in the 11th Five-
Year Plan (2006–2010;  wunian jihua) 
To overcome these obstacles, the central government implemented 
numerous measures of macroeconomic control. These measures 
included the simultaneous contraction of fiscal and monetary 
policies, the control of overheating investment, the continuing 
appreciation of yuan, the elimination of foreign trade preferential 
arrangement, the regulation of export-oriented industries, the 
cancellation of agricultural tax to raise farmers’ income, and the 
tightening of high energy-consuming investment and construction 
projects. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the government 
loosed the constraints on investment, launched numerous 
infrastructure projects to stimulate domestic demand, and raised 
the level of consumption through tax cuts. These strategies 
enabled China to recover quicker than the rest of the world. 
 
 Unfortunately, the stimulus policies had shortcomings. They 
failed to transform the export-oriented economy into a new 
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growth model. Because a significant portion of the consumption-
generated profits came from the stimulus policies, the overall rate 
of domestic consumption actually declined. In 2009, domestic 
consumption contributed 45.4% to China’s GDP, the highest 
percentage since 2002. But the consumption activities only pulled 
4.1% of the GDP growth, and this was the lowest percentage since 
2005. The domestic consumption growth largely resulted from the 
state’s campaigns of purchasing home appliances for peasants, 
exchanging cash for clunkers, and reducing vehicle purchase tax. 
Similarly, the rapid increase of China’s overall investment rate 
worsened the problem of structural imbalance. In 2009, the foreign 
and domestic investment contributed 95.2% to China’s GDP and 
pulled 8.9% of the GDP growth, the highest rate in two decades. 
Yet, the investment rate began to fall in 2010.During the 11th five-
year-plan (2006–2010), China made little progress in adjusting its 
industrial structure. Economic growth still depended on 
manufacturing, and there was little expansion in the service sector. 
 
 
Economic Policies of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) 
The central government was determined to expand consumption 
in the 12th five-year plan, focusing on the promotion of 
employment and entrepreneurship, the increase of urban and rural 
residents’ income, the standardization of a minimum wage, and 
the institutionalization of a salary raise structure for enterprise 
employees. These tactics were designed to empower consumers as 
a means of growing the economy. 
  
 With respect to industrial restructuring, the government 
favored the construction of technological parks, supported seven 
strategic industries (i.e., environmental industry, new information 
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technology, biotechnology, new energy, new energy vehicles, 
high-ended equipment manufacturing, and new industrial 
materials), and promoted the service sector. In the area of public 
services, the government sought to equalize the living standards in 
urban and rural areas, relocate rural residents to cities, and 
modernize public facilities in the countryside. 
  
 This new plan marks a clear departure from the previous focus 
on urban economic growth. As the central government invests 
more resources in public welfare and rural development, it 
formalizes this criterion as a new assessment of the local officials’ 
performance. The aggressive plans to capitalize on emerging new 
industries may contribute to economic growth, but the old 
problem of imbalance between demand and supply has yet to be 
resolved. Urbanization may become a powerful weapon to 
stimulate consumption and adjust the economic structure.7 But the 
central government has yet to outline concrete plans to make this 
idea a reality. There have been numerous reports of the local 
authorities forcing peasants to sell their land below the market 
price in the name of the urbanization.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article concludes with four policy suggestions to deepen 
China’s reform efforts. First, the government should reduce its 
intervention into micro-economy. It should instead push private 
enterprises and foreign companies to get involved in more 
industries, and guide state-owned enterprises to carry out their 
own structural upgrading. In recent years, the economic 
intervention policies by the central and local authorities betrayed 
social fairness and market efficiency. The state should employ 
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fiscal and tax policies to optimize the industrial structure, and 
assist technologically advanced industries against inefficient ones. 
It should not impose administrative commands on entrepreneurs 
and interfere in the daily operation of business enterprises. 
Meanwhile, the government authorities should eliminate the 
official monopoly in certain industries and invite private capital to 
the playing field.8 
 
 Second, the central government should liberalize the capital 
market. The marketization of interest rate and the diversification 
of capital market would enable China to restructure its vast 
financial service system in urban and rural areas, open access to 
capital for small businesses, accelerate the development of private 
financial institutions, and strengthen the supervision of the 
shadow banking system. The state should regulate the securities 
market by making it more transparent. A feasible option was to 
improve the management boards of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, making them more accountable. 
  
 Third, the central government ought to reform the fiscal system, 
and redefine the financial authorities and obligations of the central 
and local governments. China should correct the current problem 
that all levels of intergovernmental property rights and official 
obligations are asymmetrical. It is not feasible for the central 
government to receive all fiscal revenues from the local authorities 
and assume little responsibility toward the citizens. The key is to 
strengthen the consumption tax as a means of leading the local 
authorities to push policies beneficial to consumers. Another 
option is to adjust the individual income tax levy standard in 
order to alleviate income inequality. 
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 Finally, the government must invest in public welfare, and let 
the public to have a say in the debate about welfare allocation. 
China would not necessarily become a welfare state at the moment 
because the tax burden of its citizens is quite low on average, but 
they receive limited public services. A nationwide social security 
system has not been fully established to address the worries of 
urban and rural residents. Despite the repeated promises to 
improve people’s livelihoods, the government has yet to back their 
words with actions. In fact, access to public welfare is often 
determined by one’s sociopolitical privilege. The only solution is 
to implement a fair and equal welfare system for all. This helps 
transform the current system of compensation welfare into that of 
general welfare beneficial to all social sectors. Only by doing so 
will the central government cultivate a sense of economic security 
among its citizens. 
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China’s Economic Reforms at a Critical Junction  
 
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee 
 
 
 
 
Effective management of resources is key to a country’s 
development. This is particularly true for China, which 
experienced double-digit growth over the last two decades. As 
China celebrated the 120th anniversary of the birth of former 
leader Mao Zedong () in December 2013, there has been 
much discussion about the future of the nation in the twenty-first 
century.1 Building on Pan Zhen’s critique of the Chinese economy, 
this article examines some important reform policies that have 
produced the economic miracle since the 1980s, and highlights a 
number of governance crises facing the new Communist 
leadership today. 
  
 
Historicizing the Chinese Economic Miracle 
Since its founding on October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of 
China was neither a reproduction of the Soviet Union model nor 
an incarnation of the ancient Confucian empire. The Chinese 
Communist Party distinguished itself from previous regimes by 
extending its political power to control society, economy and 
national culture. The Maoist regime tightened control at all levels, 
dominating political, social, economic and cultural domains. 
However, everything changed following a series of important 
political moments. The most notorious movement was the 
Cultural Revolution, lasting from 1966 to 1976, that was launched 
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to activate popular radicalism in support of Mao Zedong, but 
almost brought down the regime. The state only survived this 
movement by effectively suppressing the popular outpourings 
that Mao had encouraged. Since then, communism as a unifying 
ideology collapsed and pragmatism prevailed under Deng 
Xiaoping () and his successors. Since the 1980s, economic 
growth has become the people’s common hope and desire, and 
thus the only collective value supporting the legitimacy of the 
People’s Republic.  
 
Under Deng’s leadership, the Communist state relied on 
several institutional mechanisms to create a fast-growing 
economy. First, China integrated itself into the global economy 
since the implementation of reform and open-door policies in the 
1980s and its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
November 2001. This enabled China to attract foreign capital to 
modernize its industrial infrastructure, and to apply international 
business regulations to transform domestic socioeconomic 
practices.2 Second, profitmaking was standardized in every level 
of the Chinese economy and held as the major criterion for 
assessing the performance of both state and private business 
enterprises. The quest for profits gave rise to a strong culture of 
business competition and this was essential for sustaining China’s 
spectacular economic growth. 
  
Third, there emerged a new entrepreneurial class or what 
Bruce J. Dickson (2003) calls “red capitalists.” 3  This class was 
initially composed of Communist Party leaders and state officials, 
ex-officials, their relatives and friends, but it took on a life of its 
own and became a powerful non-state sector with its own 
agendas. The Chinese state coopted this fast-growing sector by 
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admitting entrepreneurs into the Communist Party in 2001. As a 
result, these “red capitalists” had no intention to subvert the one-
party state as the West had hoped. Instead they supported the 
status quo and played a stabilizing role in times of crises. For 
example, many entrepreneurs donated large sums of money to 
support the state’s relief efforts in the recent deadly earthquake in 
the southwestern province of Sichuan () on May 12, 2008. 
  
Fourth, China’s rise to prominence in the world economy 
increased its influence in global politics, which was dominated by 
Western nations for the past two centuries. As the U.S. is trapped 
in two costly military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, China 
has developed strategic alliances with many developing countries 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation, the six-party nuclear talks, and the 
WTO. Giovanni Arrighi argues that the U.S. military campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan not only undermined the neoconservatives’ 
imperial project of building a new American century of world 
dominance, but also made China the true winner of the U.S. “War 
on Terror.”4 Fareed Zakaria calls this development the beginning 
of “the post-American world,” in which the U.S. retreats, and the 
rest of the world advances in economic power and political 
influence.5  
  
 
Governance Crises and Domestic Discontents 
Combining a market economy with authoritarian rule, Chinese 
Communist leaders have adapted certain tenets of capitalism such 
as opening to foreign investment, deregulating the labor market 
and building infrastructure, while maintaining firm control over 
the government, military, public security and media information. 
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Nevertheless, accompanying China’s economic miracle are 
authoritarianism and domestic unrest. It is important to explore 
four institutional obstacles confronting the new Communist 
leadership today.  
 
First, China’s rise is fraught with paradoxes and contradictions, 
and has destabilized domestic politics. As Beijing failed to resolve 
maritime sovereignty disputes with neighbors like Japan, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam through peaceful negotiation, many 
netizens organized protests to express their nationalist sentiments 
and destroyed foreign factories in China. The waves of 
nationalism have swept across the country with the public outcry 
for sanctions against foreign countries and the hostile remarks by 
commanders of the People’s Liberation Army. The widespread 
“China can say No” attitude has prevented the Chinese leaders 
from embracing new diplomatic initiatives to solve the territorial 
disputes.  
 
Second, hostility towards liberal intellectuals, critical 
journalists, and ethnic minorities continues in China. 
Imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo (	
), 
persecution of Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims, and 
forced exile of dissidents show that the state has tightened its grip 
upon the citizenry despite its rhetoric of tolerance and 
compassion. In Chongqing municipality, Bo Xilai (), son of 
revolutionary hero Bo Yibo ( ), gained much attention 
employing Maoist rhetoric and state-sponsored welfare projects 
for political gain. In Beijing, Zhou Yongkang (), who once 
controlled the national public security forces, was purged in Xi 
Jinping’s () anti-corruption campaigns.6 With the downfall 
of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the Communist leadership has 
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demonstrated its awkwardness in resolving the contradictions of 
both Maoist past and reformist present. Displays of assertiveness 
and confidence occur, moreover, with rising discontents that 
inhibit real self-assertiveness. Since the 2008 financial crisis, 
Chinese leaders have recognized the need to transform its export-
led economy into one driven by domestic consumption. 
Nevertheless, the political crises in the wake of the dismissal of Bo 
Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the leadership succession, the anti-
corruption campaigns, and the pro-democracy protests in Hong 
Kong discouraged any officials from tackling these structural 
problems and experimenting liberal reforms. 
 
Third, the reality of an economic slowdown in China suggests 
that the Communist leadership can no longer appeal to its people 
with material incentives. China today has to confront many 
negative attributes of globalization. Unprecedented growth gave 
China a temporary reprieve but the national economy has slowed 
down and the state has yet to offer a sustainable developmental 
strategy. According to Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, the 
state refused to transfer power to entrepreneurs and financial 
professionals, while ruling elites mainly used state-run 
commercial banks to drive growth that covered up nonperforming 
debts and distorted the value of bank assets.7 Whereas sustainable 
growth required China’s consumers to buy more local products, 
urging a massive transfer of wealth to the citizenry in order to do 
so, the state did the opposite by increasing spending on fixed 
investment. The injection of stimulus money into state-owned 
enterprises and large infrastructure projects was not sustainable. 
Since late 2011, many private enterprises have been bankrupt 
because they lacked the political connections to secure bank loans 
that could resolve their cash flow problems. Whether or not China 
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postpones a crisis for the time being, the days of being perceived 
as the world’s economic miracle are numbered.  
 
Finally, market liberalization is a double-edged sword. The 
rapidity with which the state has achieved growth has created 
tensions and conflicts at all levels. Extremely efficient and highly 
urban, China’s development has yielded growth rates above those 
of most developed nations. But its new wealth is unevenly 
distributed, its labor market ruthless, and its living environment 
Dickensian. Political scientist Barrington Moore remarked several 
decades ago, “The tragic fact of the matter is that the poor bear the 
heaviest costs of modernization under both socialist and capitalist 
systems. The only justification for imposing the costs is that they 
would become steadily worse off without it.” 8  Because of 
explosive grievances caused by the state’s aggressive development 
strategies and reluctance to liberalize its authoritarian system, a 
rising China that denies its citizens what they desire—such as job 
security, healthcare, gender equality and freedom—drives 
discontented sections of society to mobilize for collective action in 
order to guarantee security, solace and justice. Popular protest has 
become a prominent mode of political participation, and the 
dangers of ineffective governance will be reflected internally. As 
many as 180,000 strikes, demonstrations and protests were 
reported in 2010. This is an average of 493 incidents per day. This 
official figure indicates a dramatic increase from the 90,000 
incidents documented in 2006 and fewer than 9,000 in the mid-
1990s.9 In particular, the railway station massacre in Kunming (
) on March 1, 2014 revealed the spread of interethnic unrest 
from China’s far-western Muslim-majority Xinjiang region () 
to other parts of the country, and the deadly explosion in Urumqi 
on May 22, 2014 suggested the increased militancy of some 
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Uyghur activists against Beijing. 10  The Umbrella Revolution in 
Hong Kong, a civil disobedience campaign that demanded 
universal suffrage in elections for the chief executive and 
legislators, became a major test of crisis management for Xi 
Jinping. All these obstacles are exacerbated by many explosive 
factors such as a lack of prosperity, high inflation and 
unemployment rates, rampant corruption and incompetent 
government that is devoid of democratic legitimacy. The fear of 
internal instability may prompt the top leadership to concentrate 
on stability maintenance rather than external power projection.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Keenly aware of these governance crises, the Communist leaders 
introduced new policies in March 2014 to continue the reform 
efforts without hindering growth. These measures permitted the 
local authorities to resolve financial deficits by issuing bonds, the 
national currency yuan to fluctuate widely in offshore exchange, 
and ordinary farmers to buy and sell their land-use rights to 
urbanities. The central government also adjusted the target of 
economic growth from 7.7% in 2013 to about 7.5% in 2014, 
suggesting that the leaders were as much concerned about keeping 
the rate of growth to reduce unemployment as implementing 
radical policies that would undermine the country’s long-term 
economic prospects.11    
 
In the final analysis, China is confronting the negative aspects 
of economic liberalization. As the nation is trapped in a perceptual 
cycle of popular discontent, time seems to be running out for Xi 
Jinping to resolve these internal grievances and place the country 
on the right track. 
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Deconstructing the Dramatic Rise of Narendra 
Modi in the Global Political Theater 
 
Satish K. Kolluri 
 
 
 
 
A New Political Landscape of India 
On May 16, 2014, Narendra Damodardas Modi (or NaMo as he is 
called by his supporters) became the first Indian Prime Minister to 
be born after independence in 1947. By stating that he was chosen 
by God and Mother Ganges to fight the dynastic misrule of the 
Indian National Congress (INC) during his campaign speeches, 
Modi’s scale of victory and the mandate that he derived from the 
electoral results across the linguistically and culturally diverse 
states of India stunned his followers and critics alike. The tragic 
irony of the front page picture of Modi arranging a photo frame of 
Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) in his new office on his first day of 
work was not lost on the more discerning in that it was Nathuram 
Godse (1910–1949), a member of the radical Hindu revivalist 
organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National 
Voluntary Organization), who assassinated the Mahatma on 
January 20th, 1948. The very same RSS provided a political home to 
a young Narendra Modi by inculcating in him the ethos of 
“Hindutva” or “Hindu-ness” which insists that multi-religious, 
multicultural, and multiethnic India is fundamentally a “Hindu 
Rashtra” or “Hindu Nation.” The victory of Modi’s Bharatiya 
Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) in itself was not a surprise. 
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Some opinion polls carried out by mainstream media 
organizations had predicted the number of seats the party that 
were close enough to the real number of 283, which secured an 
absolute majority for the BJP. 
 
Predictably the Indian nation went into a celebratory mode and 
felt immense pride in pulling off the most successful election 
logistically in the nation’s history and in the world’s largest 
democracy even as the secular progressive and left forces suffered 
one of their heaviest political defeats in recent memory. For some, 
the fall of the INC-led coalition government brought relief from 
the dysfunctional and corrupt politics and practices that it 
symbolized. The Indian media left no stone unturned in joining 
the celebrations because they were more than responsible for 
bringing Modi into the living rooms of millions of Indians, not to 
mention his brand of being a visionary, an economic reformer who 
would bring in much-needed foreign investment and a proud 
Indian who will protect small business interests from the 
predatory behavior of multinational corporations. Modi’s 
prostration on the steps of Parliament on his first ever visit to the 
building and that too, as the Prime Minister-designate was a 
perfect ‘made for television’ moment. The Indian Election was 
projected to cost US$5billion, the most expensive in the country’s 
electoral history and second only to the U.S Presidential Election 
in 2012 which cost US$7 billion. “The huge sum marks India’s 
entrance into big-time election expenditures as well as the 
emergence of sophisticated Western-style campaigning, fund-
raising and the domination of social media in politics.”1 In view of 
the difficult road he had to take in order to evenly remotely appear 
Prime Ministerial in the  minds of the voters and in editorial rooms 
of mainstream media, Modi, like most well-known rightwing 
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ideologues of past and present, crafted a cleaver and brilliant 
campaign that was as relentless as it was effective when it came to 
using traditional and social media in a massive publicity and 
advertising blitzkrieg that softened up his image to an extent, and 
helped him gravitate from the face of extreme right politics of 
Hindu cultural nationalism of the RSS to the moderate center-right 
space that BJP has traditionally occupied. The media bias theory 
floated by Modi’s supporters about how his candidacy was being 
sabotaged during the campaign by the “anti-Modi” media for his 
“alleged” role in the Gujarat riots did not hold up to the critical 
scrutiny of skeptics who argued that the bias itself could have 
been a strategic construction by Team Modi to play the victim card 
in order to elicit sympathy from the voting public.2 
 
There is no dearth of critics of Narendra Modi across the world 
because they have neither been able to forget nor forgive him for 
the decisions that he consciously took or actions he did not 
deliberately take, or at the very least take moral responsibility as 
the Chief Executive of the State of Gujarat. In a chilling response to 
a question on why the riots in his state had reached such horrific 
proportions, Modi in an half nod to Isaac Newton (1642–1727) 
said, “Every action has a reaction.” Consequently, the newest 
leader of the world’s largest democracy could not travel to the 
world’s oldest democracy because he was denied a visa to the U.S. 
by the State Department under George W. Bush in 2002 as he was 
held morally and legally responsible for presiding over the horrors 
inflicted on Muslims in a pogrom that was coded as “an 
experiment” in which the State of Gujarat functioned as the 
“laboratory.” He was reviled and ostracized nationally and 
internationally except by his own Hindu BJP who accused his 
critics of demonizing him. Yet, in a span of a decade, Modi has 
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arrived in a spectacular and surreal fashion as the Prime Minister 
of India by campaigning on the vexed issues of development and 
governance and leading his own party to a clear majority in the 
Indian Parliament, despite receiving only 31 percent of the vote 
share nationally. This outcome also decimated the INC to an extent 
that the BJP does not have a coherent parliamentary opposition to 
launch any meaningful challenge to its legislations and policies. In 
a brilliant profile on Modi in 2010, Vinod K. Jose deconstructs 
Modi’s personality and politics and reveals his ways of dealing 
with dissent and disloyalty thus giving new meaning to “the 
personal is political”: “Ten years after the anti-Muslim pogroms 
that killed more than 1,200 Gujaratis, Modi has managed to bury 
the past and resurrect his own extinct prospects for political 
advancement, replacing epithets like “fascist,” “mass murderer,” 
and “Hindutva fanatic” with a title of his own choosing: Vikaas 
Purush, or Development Man.”3 
 
Such an electoral mandate will not rid Narendra Modi of the 
demons that he has repressed anytime soon, a man who is known 
to be as secretive as he is authoritarian. As the Prime Minister of 
all Indians irrespective of caste and creed, Modi has much hard 
work to do ahead to heal the fractures and find political and 
personal redemption for his misdeeds that were conveniently 
cleared by the Investigative Agencies appointed by the highest 
court in the land, even as it became clear that Modi was being 
projected as the Prime Ministerial Candidate by the BJP. 4  In 
response to the “clean chit” given to Modi, activists on the ground, 
critics and scholars alike produced counterevidence that was 
damning of the verdict issued by the Supreme Court which 
refused to listen to any plea in this highly controversial matter.5 
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A detailed documentation of the nexus between the growing 
radicalization of Gujarat when Modi became Chief Minister and 
the sources of funding from the Indian diaspora that helped this 
process was performed by secular progressive groups under the 
umbrella of a global movement, “The Campaign to Stop Funding 
Hate” (www.stopfundinghate.org) to combat the insidious 
propaganda and misinformation launched by the Modi’s machine 
to dilute the death, suffering, and trauma suffered by Muslims of 
Gujarat which were bravely captured by noted documentary 
filmmaker Rakesh Sharma in his gut-wrenching and spine chilling 
film, “The Final Solution: Gujarat genocide of minorities in India.”6 
 
 
A Critique of Modi’s Campaign Rhetoric:  
From Self-Rule to Good Governance 
It is important to note that during the course of his campaign in 
2014, Modi, ably aided by global public relations and advertising 
firms was partly successful in burying the horrific memories of the 
Gujarat riots in the national consciousness over time, and 
reinvented himself as a man who as state’s chief administrator 
brought about “economic development” through “smart 
governance.” His simple campaign message “Good days are to 
come” in the context of the outrage and deep cynicism that voters 
expressed against the Indian National Congress which ruled India 
for most of its post-independent history worked extremely 
effectively. That most of the Indian media had been euphoric 
about the “Modi-wave” sweeping through the nation is an 
understatement as it played a proactive role in getting Modi 
elected as was seen in traditional and social media. Many Indians 
wholeheartedly subscribed to Modi’s promises of all round 
economic growth and effective governance, and this advanced this 
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efforts to apply the “Gujarat model of development” to the rest of 
the country.  
 
Modi’s cultural roots in the Hindu extremist parent 
organization of RSS that believes in a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu 
State) make him the first Indian Prime Minister who is openly 
connected with an organization that emphasizes Hindu-Muslim 
divisions, and perpetually “others” the latter as second-class 
citizens because they do not authentically belonging to an 
essentially Hindu nation.  
  
Drawing from Barack H. Obama’s campaign playbook for 
honing his outreach to voters on social media and proving to be 
very successful at that, and from the Republican Party for his 
belief in small government and neo-liberal economic policies 
combined with the notion of Swadeshi (indigenous economic 
policies), Modi’s strong messaging and the frequent rendition of 
his personal narrative of being from a “backward caste” and 
starting his work life as a tea seller at a railway station, and being a 
complete outsider to “the establishment of Delhi” in vehement 
opposition to the politically entrenched and so-called pseudo-
secular” Gandhi family, resonated deeply across large swathes of  
urban, middle-class Indian voters across the nation, who embraced 
his aspirational “middle-class” story to heart. By winning in a 
decisive way, some like Santosh Desai who is a social 
commentator and branding expert gave voice to Modi’s stunning 
victory at the polls in context: 
 
The politics spawned by Nehruvian liberalism has evoked a 
simmering sense of rage. For some time now, the self-described 
cultural mainstream has been seething at what they see as the 
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contemptuous rejection of their way of life and their ideals by a 
group that deals in ideas that have no natural cultural 
resonance with the Indian reality. The fault line is essentially a 
cultural one—democracy has been seen as a vehicle that has 
served to impose a new set of ideals with an alien vocabulary 
on a passive majority.7 
  
In attempting to capture the rage and alienation felt by the “self-
described cultural mainstream” (i.e., Hindu mainstream) brought 
about by Nehruvian liberals, Desai represents Modi and Nehru as 
two sides of a culture war in India, where on the one side, the 
inheritors of Nehruvian liberalism see themselves as liberals 
invested in issues like anti-casteism, fair treatment of minorities, 
and social and economic justice that the socialist-democratic-
secular State embodies. Desai’s ambiguous use of “cultural 
mainstream” finds form in the new India promised by Modi 
government as “benign majoritarianism, where the majoritarian is 
imagined not merely in terms of religion but in all aspects of 
reality as it exists (and) nation as a formulation—the notion of 
‘India First’ is shorthand for existing reality with its structure and 
way of life intact.”8 
   
A critical reading of this “benign majoritarianism” is to 
compare it to a nationalist vision that is not merely bound by the 
geographical and cultural identity of “Bharat” that not only rejects 
alien vocabulary, but is marked by a timeless cultural heritage 
which is central to all religions, languages and castes, and thus 
constitutes a discourse of cultural nationalism that seeks to 
“Indianize, Spiritualize, and Nationalize” the nation in the form of 
Hindtuva that does not practice minority appeasement in the 
name of “pseudo-secularism” that progressives are accused of, 
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that actively supports laws that criminalize “sedition” and 
“homosexuality” or attempts to relegate the figure of the Indian 
woman to tradition and domesticity by coding her as “the inner or 
spiritual identity” of the Hindu nation.   
 
Political candidates in democratic elections usually campaign 
from the extremes to consolidate their political base, and then 
gradually move to the center in order to appeal to a much larger 
base, and more importantly, appear to have the ability to govern. 
During the course of his campaign, Narendra  Modi did just that 
by lacerating the Congress Party’s rule in language that effectively 
tapped into the rapidly growing negative sentiments about the 
Gandhi family, which was entrusted the newly independent 
nation under its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889—
1964). In calling the party a crowd around a family in other words, 
Modi notes in his campaign speeches: “Congress is a party that has 
sacrificed the interests of the nation for the interests of one family. 
To take the country forward is not in the nature of the Congress, it 
is not in their blood. When we got freedom from the British, we 
got Swarajya (Self-Rule) and when free ourselves from the 
Congress, we will get Surajya (Good Governance).” 9  In an 
insightful rhetorical analysis of Modi’s campaign speeches, Nonica 
Dutta explains,  
 
Modi’s language shapes a new political public sphere of power 
and domination to manufacture consent among his karyakartas 
(party workers). His rhetoric against the Congress, his model of 
a “grand state and nation,” his confidence in the “mass base” of 
his karyakartas, his stubborn faith in development and 
progress are the recurring themes in his vocabulary. Listening 
to him one notices that though his script is almost 
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stereotypically repetitive, his repertoire carries a new gesture 
each time he speaks. His language is interspersed with humor 
and sarcasm; but no ironies. With the approaching 2014 general 
elections, his speech at his premier political organization is full 
of contradictions, ambiguities, inconsistencies, silences. Modi’s 
language, this may be noticed in almost all his recent speeches, 
camouflages much than reveals.10 
 
Brand Modi was successful in convincing the urban middle-
class voters and youth that the only way for India to move 
forward was to recognize that the true meaning of Swarajya (Self-
Rule) could only be achieved through Surajya (Good Governance). 
But the challenges facing India’s new Prime Minister are daunting 
because Modi has to rule against the backdrop of a volatile 
economy that has not seen the best of times over the past six years. 
He has to move from campaign mode to governance mode, and 
confront the inevitable clash between forces of free enterprise and 
neo-liberalization on the one side, and the role of a socialist 
welfare state on the other, keeping in mind the acute income 
inequality that is only getting worse in India and the rest of the 
world.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In precisely being ambiguous, inconsistent, silent and 
contradictory about his messaging, be it a simultaneous gesture 
towards neoliberal economic development on the one hand, and 
“Swadeshi” (Made-in-India Model) on the other, Modi with his 
style of authoritarian governance appealed to a critical cross 
section of voters, ranging from the urban industrialists, 
entrepreneurs, and rural farming elites to the middle-class 
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computer programmers and working-class taxi drivers. Millions of 
Indians voted for Modi irrespective of who their local candidates 
were.  
 
The marketing of brand Modi was seen as an unprecedented 
effort in the history of Indian politics, not just in the realm of 
product marketing, but any form of marketing where it was all 
about him only. Team Modi that drew technocratic talents from 
the Indian diaspora left no stone unturned. They were relentless in 
their selling of brand Modi and by the end of the six month 
campaign, his team had covered 600,000 villages, almost every 
urban and semi-urban household, every TV set, cellphone, radio 
and even social media. They in all constituted the 31 percent of 
voters in favor of Modi’s BJP, and this outcome gave the party a 
majority in the Parliament, thus ending the practice of coalition 
dharma in Indian politics for now at least.  
  
Whether Modi will subscribe to the above-mentioned 
rightwing ideology which constitutes the bedrock of the RSS and 
its more “moderate” faced BJP in the public sphere, is open to 
debate. He has formed a small cabinet of twenty-three ministers 
and out of them, seventeen have political roots in the RSS and 
there is only one Muslim (woman) in the cabinet who is in charge 
of Minority Affairs (i.e., Muslim affairs), a gesture of tokenism that 
slapped irony in the face for some. In asking, “how the king 
(Narendra Modi) be guided by his raj guru (the RSS)?” the 
editorial team of the left-leaning Economic and Political Weekly 
concludes:  
 
Narendra Modi is, after all, beholden to both the RSS and big 
business—dharma and artha (the latter, the desire to accumulate 
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material wealth). So it will all depend on how the RSS, the self-
anointed spiritual counsellor of the rashtra, preserves 
the dharma even as it accommodates the artha. The king, in its 
view, must be guided by the raj guru in the preservation of the 
ideology of Hindutva nationalism.11 
 
Will Modi be a pragmatist by defying his “raj guru” and 
govern from the political center where he would inhabit a 
moderate ideological space? Or will he still be a “Hindutvadi” 
who will reap political and material dividend based on the 
electoral mandate that he secured to exacerbate the communal 
divide and income inequality? Only the near future will tell. 
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